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Abstract—We address the problem of attack detection
and attack correction for multi-output discrete-time linear
time-invariant systems under sensor attack. More specif-
ically, we focus on the situation where adversarial attack
signals are added to some of the system’s output signals. A
‘security index’ is defined to characterize the vulnerability
of a system against such sensor attacks. Methods to
compute the security index are presented as are algorithms
to detect and correct for sensor attacks. The results are
illustrated by examples involving multiple sensors.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s society, the physical infrastructure in
support of critical services such as water and energy
can be described as a cyber-physical system. The end-
to-end service can therefore be affected not only by the
loss of functionality of the physical assets (breaking of
wires or pipes, loss of motors or sensors, due to, for
example, accidental breakage or maintenance outages
or due to a natural disaster) but also through loss of
functionality in the cyber assets (like loss of bandwidth
in communication channels, message loss, or a virus in
a computer operating system).
In this paper, the particular cyber attack scenario
where sensor signals may be corrupted by additive
signals is considered. In the case where such signals are
injected based on knowledge of a model of the system’s
behaviour, it no longer suffices to treat these external
signals as mere disturbances or noise, as in fact they
can be used to control the behaviour. For instance, it is
conceivable that a modern autonomous vehicle may be
hijacked using sensor spoofing [26].
This issue has captured the attention of the control
community. Several attack detection methods have been
proposed in the literature, such as [18], [1], [16]. Correc-
tion methods have also been discussed in the literature,
such as [7], [23], [17], [4].
In this paper, the case of discrete-time, linear and time-
invariant (LTI) systems where output signals may be
compromised is considered. Attack signals are modeled
as signals added to the output signals. To assist in
the analysis, the notion of the ‘security index’ of a
system is introduced. This is analogous to the notion
of the ‘minimum distance’ used in coding theory. The
main tools used in this paper are kernel representations
of systems and the setting is the behavioral approach
[19]. The security index is a quantitative representation-
free measure of the vulnerability of a system to sensor
attacks. It speaks to the detectability and correctability
of attack signals.
Unlike much of the work in this area, our starting point
in this paper is a kernel representation (see for example
[19, Ch2.5]) rather than a state space representation.
Reasons for this are: 1. Many well-established theorems
based on kernel representations can be applied when we
are discussing a system using a behavioral approach. 2.
Every kernel representation can be brought into state
space form (see subsection VII.4) and every observable
system in state space form can be transformed into a
kernel representation. 3. The implementation of systems
in kernel representation can be done straightforwardly
using shift operators.
Previous works involving systems under sensor at-
tacks include [4], [7], [1], [23], [8]. The work of [7]
focuses on reconstructing the state value using a relaxed
optimization program to approximate an NP-hard l0-
norm optimization problem. We demonstrate that our
formulation simplifies the approach. There is a consensus
of our result with [4] that the output signals are only
guaranteed to be reconstructible if a certain upper bound
on the number of attacked sensors is met. We reformulate
the assumptions of [4] in terms of the security index and
derive methods for detection as well as correction. Other
related works are [25] which focuses on the establish-
ment of the models for various attack signals; and [10]
which focuses on the security of power networks.
The focus of our paper is on the development of a
conceptual approach to attack detection and correction.
Unlike e.g. [4], [15], [6], we restrict ourselves to a noise-
free environment to enable the reader to understand the
essence of the proposed methods. These methods then
serve as a starting point for further research on the noisy
case.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section II
presents some notation used in the paper. Section III
describes the system and the problem statements, while
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2Section IV defines the security index, attack detectability
and attack correctability. A method of computing the
security index in terms of a kernel representation is
given in Section V. Section VI presents the Kronecker-
Hermite canonical form representation. Section VII gives
an attack detection method and uses the Kronecker-
Hermite canonical form to design attack correction meth-
ods, first for the maximally secure case, then for the
general case. The theory is illustrated in Section VIII
by results and simulations for two discrete-time LTI
system examples that involve multiple sensors. Finally,
conclusions and future work directions are presented in
Section IX. This paper builds on preliminary work by
two of its authors [2], [3], and the main new result is
the attack correction method.
II. NOTATION
• Let Z+ = {0, 1, . . . } and R := (−∞,∞).
• The N -dimensional signal y = (y1, ..., yN )T is
denoted as y : Z+ → RN .
• An N ×N identity matrix is denoted by IN .
• The support of a signal is denoted by supp (y) :=
{i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : yi is not the zero signal}.
• The weight of a signal y is denoted by ‖y‖ :=
|supp(y)|, i.e., the number of components of y that
are non-zero signals.
• If J is a subset of {1, . . . , N} then its complemen-
tary set is denoted by J¯ .
• The shift operator σ is defined as σy(t) := y(t+1).
• The degree of a polynomial a(ξ) is denoted by
deg a(ξ).
• The greatest common divisor of two polynomials
a(ξ) and b(ξ) is denoted by GCD(a(ξ), b(ξ)).
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a linear time-invariant (LTI) system Σ in its
kernel representation as follows
Σ : R(σ)y = 0, (1)
where y : Z+ → RN is the sensor output signal of the
system Σ and R(ξ) is a real polynomial matrix of full
rank, meaning that the system’s behaviour is autonomous
with no free variables. The size of R(ξ) is N ×N .
Definition III.1 (Behaviour of the system Σ). The be-
haviour of the system Σ is defined as the set given by
B = {y : Z+ → RN | R(σ)y = 0}. (2)
Consider a class A of attack signals η : Z+ → RN .
A corrupted output signal is r = y + η. Here we denote
the resulting system by ΣA, more specifically we have
the following definition.
Definition III.2 (Behaviour of the system ΣA). The
behaviour of the corrupted system ΣA is defined as the
set of possible received signals
BA = {r : Z+ → RN | r = y+η, where y ∈ B, η ∈ A}.
(3)
Definition III.3 (Attack detectability). A non-zero attack
signal η ∈ A is detectable if η /∈ B.
Definition III.4 (Attack correctability). A non-zero at-
tack signal η ∈ A is correctable if for all η′ 6= η, the
following is satisfied
η′ ∈ A ⇒ η − η′ /∈ B. (4)
Our objectives in this paper are to first determine
the feasibility of attack detection/correction and then to
give an attack detection as well as correction method.
We show that these methods are guaranteed to produce
the correct outcome under certain assumptions about the
attack set A.
IV. ATTACK DETECTION/CORRECTION FEASIBILITY
In this section we first address the vulnerability of a
system given by (1) against attacks on its sensor outputs
y. We then introduce a concept that is central to this
paper called the security index δ(Σ) of the system Σ, and
then we state conditions to achieve attack detectability
and correctability. These conditions are stated in terms
of δ(Σ). The definitions and results of this section can
also be found in [2], [3].
Definition IV.1. The security index of the system Σ is
defined as
δ(Σ) := min
06=y∈B
‖y‖. (5)
Theorem IV.1. (Attack detection capability of the sys-
tem) Let A = {η : Z+ → RN | ‖η‖ < δ(Σ)and η 6= 0}.
All attack signals η ∈ A are detectable.
Proof. For any attack signal η from A we must have η /∈
B because of Definition IV.1. According to Definition
III.3, η is then detectable and this completes the proof.
Because of the above theorem, the security index δ(Σ)
of a system Σ can be viewed as the minimum number of
sensors that have to be attacked in order to implement
an undetectable attack. For example, if a system Σ with
N = 7 sensors has security index δ(Σ) = 5, then at
least 5 of the 7 sensors have to be attacked to achieve
an undetectable attack. In accordance with [2], [3] we
call a system Σ with N outputs maximally secure if its
security index equals δ(Σ) = N .
3Theorem IV.2. (Attack correction capability of the
system) Let A = {η : Z+ → RN | ‖η‖ <
δ(Σ)/2and η 6= 0}. All attack signals η ∈ A are
correctable.
Proof. Consider an attack signal η from A. If there exists
another non-zero η′ with ‖η′‖ < δ(Σ)/2 and η′ 6= η, then
‖η−η′‖ ≤ ‖η‖+‖η′‖ < δ(Σ) which implies η−η′ /∈ B.
According to Definition III.4, η is then correctable and
this completes the proof.
It follows from the above theorem that the value
of δ(Σ)/2 can be viewed as the minimum number of
sensors that have to be attacked in order to implement
an uncorrectable attack. For example, if a system Σ with
N = 7 sensors has security index δ(Σ) = 5, then at
least 3 of the 7 sensors have to be attacked to achieve
an uncorrectable attack.
Remark IV.3. Regarding the detection and correction of
an attack signal η, there are three different situations:
Case 1: ‖η‖ < δ(Σ)/2, i.e., the attack signal is
both detectable and correctable. This means that one
can detect the existence of η and there exists a unique
correction for this attack signal.
Case 2: δ(Σ)/2 ≤ ‖η‖ < δ(Σ), i.e., the attack signal
is detectable but not correctable. This means that one
can detect the existence of η but cannot guarantee the
existence of a unique correction for this attack signal.
Case 3: δ(Σ) ≤ ‖η‖, i.e., the attack signal is neither
detectable nor correctable. This means that one cannot
guarantee that the attack signal can be detected, also one
cannot guarantee the existence of a unique correction for
this attack signal.
V. COMPUTATION OF THE SECURITY INDEX
In this section, we seek to express the security index
δ(Σ) of a LTI system Σ in terms of its kernel represen-
tation (1). The following preliminaries on polynomial
matrices are required.
A square polynomial matrix is called unimodular if it
has a polynomial inverse and a non-square polynomial
matrix is called left (right) unimodular if it has a polyno-
mial left (right) inverse. Two polynomial matrices R(ξ)
and Q(ξ) of the same size are called left unimodularly
equivalent if there exists a unimodular matrix U(ξ) such
that Q(ξ) = U(ξ)R(ξ). In the next two definitions J is
assumed to be a subset of {1, . . . , N}.
Definition V.1. Define RJ (ξ) as an N × ‖J ‖ matrix
that consists of the i-th columns of R(ξ) where i ∈ J .
Definition V.2. Define yJ as the signal that consists of
the i-th components of y where i ∈ J ; thus yJ¯ is the
signal that consists of the i-th components of y where
i /∈ J .
The following theorem is a reformulation of a result
in [2], [3].
Theorem V.1 (Security index calculation). Consider a
system Σ whose behavior B is non-zero and given by
(1), where R(ξ) has full rank. Then
δ(Σ) = L+ 1, (6)
where L is the largest integer such that for any subset
J ⊆ {1, . . . , N} of cardinality L, the N × L matrix
RJ (ξ) is left unimodular.
Proof. Clearly, there exists a subset J ⊆ {1, . . . , N} of
cardinality L+1 such that RJ (ξ) is not left unimodular.
Thus there exists a nonzero signal y? that satisfies
RJ (σ)y? = 0. Now let y : Z+ → RN be the signal
satisfying yJ = y? and yJ¯ = 0. Then y ∈ B and
‖y‖ = ‖y?‖ ≤ L+ 1. This implies that
δ(Σ) ≤ L+ 1. (7)
To prove that also δ(Σ) ≥ L+ 1, let y be a signal in B
of weight δ(Σ). Define J¯ ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} as the set of
cardinality δ(Σ) for which yJ = 0. Then RJ¯ (ξ)yJ¯ = 0
and because yJ¯ 6= 0 it follows that RJ¯ (ξ) is not left
unimodular. This implies that L < δ(Σ). Because of (7)
it follows that equation (6) holds.
Corollary V.2. ([3, Cor. IV.6]) The system Σ in (1)
is maximally secure if and only if all N × (N − 1)
submatrices of R(ξ) are left unimodular.
VI. CANONICAL KERNEL REPRESENTATION
When we describe a system’s behavior B using a
kernel representation R(σ)y = 0, the polynomial matrix
R(ξ) is not unique. In this section, we recall results from
the literature around equivalent kernel representations for
B. We then use this to single out a canonical form of
R(ξ) which is vital for our results on attack correction.
Theorem VI.1. (e.g. [13, Theorem 3.9]) Consider two
systems Σ and Σ′ whose behaviors B and B′ are given
by B = {y|R(σ)y = 0} and B′ = {y′|R′(σ)y′ = 0},
respectively. Assume that R(ξ) and R′(ξ) are square
matrices of the same size, then B = B′ if and only if
R(ξ) and R
′
(ξ) are left unimodularly equivalent.
Minimal lag kernel representations (i.e., where the
row degrees of R(ξ) are minimal, namely the system’s
observability indices) are relevant to many problems in
systems and control. However, it turns out that minimal
lag representations do not lend themselves well to the
4design of attack correction methods. Instead, we find that
a different canonical form needs to be used, namely the
Kronecker-Hermite form. We recall this theory in the
next theorem and more generally in Theorem VII.3. In
the next section we will see that it serves as an important
tool for our attack correction method.
Theorem VI.2. (Kronecker-Hermite canonical kernel
representation of a maximally secure system) Let R(ξ)
be a N × N polynomial matrix whose determinant is
non-zero. Assume that all N × (N − 1) submatrices of
R(ξ) are left unimodular. Then there exists a unimodular
matrix U(ξ) such that
U(ξ)R(ξ) =

IN−1
−c1(ξ)
−c2(ξ)
...
−cN−1(ξ)
0 . . . 0 a(ξ)
 , (8)
where cj(ξ) is coprime with a(ξ) and deg cj(ξ) <
deg a(ξ) for all j ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} .
Proof. It follows from e.g. Theorem B.1.1 in [19]
that there exists a unimodular matrix U0(ξ) such that
U0(ξ)R(ξ) is an upper triangular polynomial matrix, say
R0(ξ), written as
R0(ξ) =
a1(ξ) b12(ξ) b13(ξ) . . . b1(N−1)(ξ) b1N (ξ)
0 a2(ξ) b23(ξ) . . . b2(N−1)(ξ) b2N (ξ)
0 0 a3(ξ) . . . b3(N−1)(ξ) b3N (ξ)
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . aN−1(ξ) b(N−1)N (ξ)
0 0 0 . . . 0 aN (ξ)

.
Since all N × (N − 1) submatrices of R(ξ) are left
unimodular, it follows that in particular the matrix
formed by the first N − 1 columns is left unimodular.
This implies that all its diagonal elements are nonzero
constants. Without restrictions, R0(ξ) can then be written
as
1 b12(ξ) b13(ξ) . . . b1(N−1)(ξ) b1N (ξ)
0 1 b23(ξ) . . . b2(N−1)(ξ) b2N (ξ)
0 0 1 . . . b3(N−1)(ξ) b3N (ξ)
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 b(N−1)N (ξ)
0 0 0 . . . 0 aN (ξ)

.
(9)
It has been shown in e.g. [9, Theorem 2.40], [5, The-
orem 7.5] or [11] that there exists a unimodular matrix
U1(ξ) such that U1(ξ)R0(ξ) is in Kronecker-Hermite
canonical form as in (8) with deg a(ξ) > deg cj(ξ).
Finally, according to Corollary V.2, the matrix in (8) has
the property that all its N × (N −1) submatrices are left
unimodular. It can be easily checked that this implies that
cj(ξ) is coprime with a(ξ), i.e., GCD(cj(ξ), a(ξ)) = 1
for all j ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, and this completes the
proof.
VII. ATTACK DETECTION AND CORRECTION
ALGORITHMS
In this section, we propose methods to achieve attack
detection and correction. Recall (1) and (3), the output
generated by the attacked system ΣA is r = y + η
where y is the attack-free sensor output of the system
Σ. In linear coding theory, syndrome computation is an
effective method for error detection, see e.g. [20, Ch.
7]. Similarly we will work with a signal that we call the
“residual signal”, defined as s = R(σ)r to perform attack
detection (Section VII-A). To achieve attack correction
(Sections VII-B and VII-C), we use a majority vote rule
reminiscent of decoding techniques such as in [21].
A. Attack detection
For attack detection, we propose Algorithm 1 below.
Algorithm 1 Attack detection
1: procedure (R(ξ), r, η)
. Given R(ξ) and r, detect whether η is the zero
signal.
2: Calculate s = R(σ)r.
3: if s = 0 then decide no attack, i.e., η = 0.
4: else decide attack occurred, i.e., η 6= 0.
5: end if
6: end procedure
Theorem VII.1 (Attack detection). Consider a system
given by (1). Let r = y + η be a received signal with
y ∈ B. Then the residual signal s = 0 if and only if
η ∈ B. Thus Algorithm 1 gives the correct result if η is
detectable.
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from
s = R(σ)r = R(σ)(y+ η) = R(σ)y+R(σ)η = R(σ)η.
B. Attack correction for a maximally secure system
In this section we show how the Kronecker-Hermite
canonical form kernel representation of the previous
section can be used to perform attack correction for a
maximally secure system. Without loss of generality, we
5assume that R(ξ) is in the Kronecker-Hermite canonical
form (8). Thus the system is given by
[
IN
0
]
y =

c1(σ)
...
cN−1(σ)
1
a(σ)
 yN . (10)
Before defining our method of attack correction, we need
the following definitions and computations:
• Define polynomials pj(ξ) and qj(ξ) satisfying[
pj(ξ) qj(ξ)
] [cj(ξ)
a(ξ)
]
= 1, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}.
(11)
Note that the existence of pj(ξ) and qj(ξ) follows
from the fact that GCD(cj(ξ), a(ξ)) = 1; the
Extended GCD Algorithm (e.g. Ch 4.2 in [24]) can
be used to find pj(ξ) and qj(ξ).
• The majority vote function over a set of signals
{v1, v2, . . . , vL}, denoted by Maj{v1, v2, . . . , vL},
is defined to be the most frequently occurring signal
in the set of vj’s.
Algorithm 2 Attack correction for a maximally secure
system given by (10)
1: procedure (a(ξ), c1(ξ), . . . , cN−1(ξ), r, yˆ)
. Given a(ξ), cj(ξ)’s and r, compute yˆ.
2: Calculate
yˆN = Maj{p1(σ)r1, p2(σ)r2, . . . , pN−1(σ)rN−1, rN},
(12)
where pj(ξ) is defined as in (11).
3: yˆj = cj(σ)yˆN for j = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1.
4: return yˆ =
[
yˆ1 yˆ2 . . . yˆN
]
.
5: end procedure
Theorem VII.2. Consider a maximally secure system
Σ given by (1). Let the received signal r be input to
Algorithm 2. Assume that r = y + η with y ∈ B and
‖η‖ < N/2. Then the output yˆ of Algorithm 2 equals y.
Proof. We have [
1
0
]
yj =
[
cj(σ)
a(σ)
]
yN ,
so that it follows from (11) that pj(σ)yj = yN for j =
1, 2, . . . , N (here we define pN (ξ) ≡ 1). Now
pj(σ)rj = pj(σ)(yj + ηj) = yN + pj(σ)ηj
for j = 1, 2, . . . , N . Since ‖η‖ < N/2 it follows that
(12) computes yˆN = yN . Consequently yj can be found
from yj = cj(σ)yN for j = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 and this
proves the theorem.
Note that the results in this subsection require the sys-
tem to be maximally secure. The next subsection deals
with the general case where systems are not necessarily
maximally secure.
C. Attack correction for the general case
Theorem VII.3. (Kronecker-Hermite canonical ker-
nel representation of R(ξ)—general case) Let R(ξ)
be a N × N polynomial matrix whose determinant is
nonzero. Let L be the largest integer such that, for any
subset J ⊆ {1, . . . , N} of cardinality L, the N × L
matrix RJ (ξ) is left unimodular. Then there exists a
unimodular matrix U(ξ) such that
U(ξ)R(ξ) =
[
IL −M1(ξ)
0 . . . 0 D(ξ)
]
. (13)
where D(ξ) is an upper triangular matrix and the degree
of the diagonal entities of D(ξ) denoted as deg dii(ξ)
for i ∈ {1, ..., N − L}, is strictly the highest within the
corresponding column of (13).
Proof. The proof follows the same reasoning as the proof
of Theorem VI.2, but replacing N − 1 by L.
Combining Theorem V.1 and Theorem VII.3, it fol-
lows that the signals y in the behavior of a system Σ with
security index δ are given by the following representationIδ−1 00 IN−δ+1
0 0
 y =
M1(σ)IN−δ+1
D(σ)
 `, (14)
where the signal ` is an auxiliary signal that can be
interpreted as a “state signal” that drives the system’s
behavior. In the representation (14) the signal ` simply
coincides with the last N − δ + 1 components of y.
In fact, the above representation (14) is a special case
of a more general representation [27], [14], given as[
IN
0
]
y =
[
M(σ)
D(σ)
]
`, (15)
where ` : Z+ → Rm, M(ξ) is a N × m polynomial
matrix and D(ξ) is a m × m polynomial matrix, for
some integer m. We make the observability assumption
that the (N +m)×m polynomial matrix
[
M(ξ)
D(ξ)
]
is left
unimodular, noting that this clearly holds for the above
6representation (14). Note that the representation (8) of
the previous subsection is a special case of (15), namely
M(ξ) :=

c1(ξ)
...
cN−1(ξ)
1
 and D(ξ) := a(ξ).
As a first step towards attack correction in the general
case, we express the system’s security index in terms of
the polynomial matrices M(ξ) and D(ξ) of the general
representation (15).
Theorem VII.4. Consider a system Σ whose behavior
B is nonzero and given by (15). Then
δ(Σ) = N + 1− L˜, (16)
where L˜ is the smallest integer such that for any subset
J ⊆ {1, . . . , N} of cardinality L˜, the (L˜ + m) × m
matrix
[
MJ (ξ)
D(ξ)
]
is left unimodular.
Proof. Clearly, there exists a subset J ⊆ {1, . . . , N} of
cardinality L˜−1 such that
[
MJ (ξ)
D(ξ)
]
is not left unimod-
ular. Thus there exists a nonzero signal `? that satisfies[
MJ (σ)
D(σ)
]
`? = 0. Now consider the signal y defined as
y := M(σ)`?. Clearly ‖y‖ ≤ N − (L˜− 1) = N − L˜+ 1.
This implies that
δ(Σ) ≤ N − L˜+ 1. (17)
To prove that also δ(Σ) ≥ N − L˜+ 1, let y? be a signal
in B of weight δ(Σ). Thus there exists a nonzero signal
`? such that [
IN
0
]
y? =
[
M(σ)
D(σ)
]
`?. (18)
Define J¯ ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} as the set of cardinality δ(Σ)
for which y?J = 0. Then
[
MJ (σ)
D(σ)
]
`? = 0 and because
`? 6= 0, it follows that
[
MJ (σ)
D(σ)
]
is not left unimodular.
This implies that L˜ ≥ N − δ(Σ) + 1. Because of (17),
it follows that equation (16) holds.
Before defining our method of attack correction, we
need several preliminary computations. Let J be a subset
of {1, . . . , N} of cardinality N+1−δ. Suppose that the
matrix
[
MJ (ξ)
D(ξ)
]
is left unimodular. Define polynomial
matrices PJ (ξ) and QJ (ξ) such that[
PJ (ξ) QJ (ξ)
] [MJ (ξ)
D(ξ)
]
= IN+1−δ. (19)
Algorithm 3 Attack correction for general system given
by (15)
1: procedure (M(ξ), D(ξ), δ, r, yˆ)
. Given M(ξ), D(ξ), δ and r, compute yˆ.
2: Calculate
ˆ`= Maj{PJ (σ)rJ }, (20)
where the majority vote is taken over all subsets J
of cardinality N + 1− δ and PJ (ξ) is defined as in
(19).
3: yˆ = M(σ)ˆ`.
4: return yˆ.
5: end procedure
In Algorithm 3 we can interpret each computation
PJ (σ)rJ as an exact observer (see proof of Theorem
VII.5) that produces an estimated signal ˆ` from the
received signal r. The algorithm directs us to take a
majority vote of all such observer outcomes and to
declare this signal to be the correct signal `. As we will
see below, this algorithm and the next theorem are the
main results of this paper. We note that the next theorem
requires a nontrivial proof, reminiscent of majority vote
proofs in the classical coding literature, such as [21].
Theorem VII.5. Consider a system Σ given by (1);
denote its security index by δ. Let the received signal
r be input to Algorithm 3. Assume that r = y + η with
y ∈ B and ‖η‖ < δ/2. Then the output yˆ of Algorithm 3
equals y.
Proof. Let’s denote ‖η‖ = the number of attacked
sensors by t, thus 2t < δ. Let J be a subset of cardinality
N + 1− δ from the set of unattacked sensors. Then[
IN+1−δ
0
]
rJ =
[
IN+1−δ
0
]
yJ =
[
MJ (σ)
D(σ)
]
`, (21)
where ` is the correct signal. We first show that (20)
is well defined. Because of Theorem VII.4, the matrix[
MJ (ξ)
D(ξ)
]
is left unimodular, so that matrices PJ (ξ) and
QJ (ξ) can be found such that (19) holds. Using (19), it
follows from (21) that ˆ`= PJ (σ)rJ equals the correct
signal `. There are
(
N−t
N+1−δ
)
ways to choose a subset
J of cardinality N + 1 − δ from the set of unattacked
sensors. Each of these choices leads to ˆ` as the correct
signal `.
Next, let’s consider a subset J ? of cardinality N +1−δ
that leads to a signal ˆ` that is incorrect, say `? 6= `.
Clearly J ? must involve one or more attacked sensors.
Since J ? has only N + 1 − δ elements, it follows that
7all unattacked sensors that are involved in J ? fit into a
certain subset, say I of N − δ unattacked sensors. Now
define the set I? as the union of I and all t attacked
sensors. Then a set J of cardinality N + 1 − δ that is
a subset of I? may lead to the same incorrect `?. Let’s
now consider a set J˜ of cardinality N + 1− δ that leads
to the incorrect signal `? but that is not a subset of I?.
We note that J˜ must then involve an unattacked sensor
outside of I. Thus there exist more than N−δ unattacked
sensors that lead to the same signal `?. Since any set of
N − δ + 1 unattacked sensors lead to the correct signal
`, it follows that `? must be the correct signal `, which
is a contradiction. We conclude that J˜ does not lead to
`?.
From this reasoning, it follows that there are at most(
N−δ+t
N+1−δ
)
choices of J that lead to the same incorrect
`?. Now recall from the first part of this proof that there
are at least
(
N−t
N+1−δ
)
choices of J that lead to the correct
signal `. Since 2t < δ we have(
N − t
N + 1− δ
)
>
(
N − δ + t
N + 1− δ
)
,
so that the majority vote in Algorithm 3 leads to the
correct `. As a result, yˆ = M(σ)ˆ` = M(σ)` equals the
correct signal y and this proves the theorem.
D. Comparison with the literature
The attack correction method for the general case of
Subsection VII-C is useful because the representation
(15) is very general. For example, a special case of (15)
is
M(ξ) :=
 c1(ξ)...
cN (ξ)
 and D(ξ) := a(ξ),
and we see that Lemma IV-8 of [3] then follows imme-
diately from the above theorem.
Another special case is a state space representation—
then M(ξ) equals a constant N × n “output matrix”
C and D(ξ) = ξIn − A, where A is a constant “state
transition matrix”. As this is the type of representation
that is considered in e.g. [4], [23], [22], [7], we are now
in a position to compare our results with the literature in
this area. In contrast to our representation-free definition
of “security index”, much of the literature implicitly
defines a similar notion in terms of the matrices A and C
of the state space representation. For example [4] defines
M -attack observability of a state space representation
(A,C) in terms of the matrices A and C. In terms of
our notion of security index δ(Σ), any observable state
space representation (A,C) is bδ(Σ)/2c-attack observ-
able. Alternatively, in the terminology of [23], [22], this
is phrased as (δ(Σ)− 1)-sparse attack observability.
Comparing our Algorithm 3 to the noise-free attack
correction method of [4, Section III-A] and [22, Section
III-A], we see that our Algorithm 3 is simpler with lower
computational complexity, as it requires fewer observers
and fewer observer comparisons.
VIII. EXAMPLES
We illustrate the workings of the proposed attack cor-
rection method with two examples. In the first example
the A matrix is in companion form so as to be able
to illustrate our theory with very simple observers. The
second example has an A matrix that is not in companion
form.
A. Example 1
Consider a discrete-time LTI system given by a state
space representation (A,C) with
A =
0 1 00 0 1
1
2 −32 32
 , C = I3, y(0) =
11
1
 .
Note that this system is marginally stable with three
distinct eigenvalues: λ1 = 1∠60◦, λ2 = 1∠ − 60◦
and λ3 = 12 . Its Kronecker-Hermite canonical kernel
representation can be computed as
R(ξ) =
1 0 −6ξ2 + 7ξ − 60 1 −2ξ2 + 3ξ − 3
0 0 ξ3 − 32ξ2 + 32ξ − 12

Using Corollary V.2, we find that the system is max-
imally secure, i.e., δ(Σ) = 3. According to Theorems
IV.1 and IV.2 the system can detect up to 2 sensor attacks
and it can correct any single sensor attack. The value
of observer pj(ξ)s and corresponding qj(ξ)s that satisfy
equation (11) can be computed as follows:
p1(ξ) = ξ
2, q1(ξ) = −6ξ − 2
p2(ξ) = ξ, q2(ξ) = −2
Algorithm 2 yields the following attack correction out-
comes:
yˆ3 = Maj{σ2r1, σr2, r3}
yˆ1 = (6σ
2 − 7σ + 6)yˆ3
yˆ2 = (2σ
2 − 3σ + 3)yˆ3
(22)
Figure 1 shows the block diagram of the attack correction
method.
Next, we conduct a simulation to illustrate the work-
ings of the attack correction method for this example.
First, we specify a single sensor attack signal on sensor
3, as illustrated in Figure 2. Here the attack signal is
8Fig. 1: Block diagram for attack correction
Fig. 2: Attack signal on sensor 3
generated as an i.i.d. random sequence using a uniform
distribution on the interval (−1, 1).
Figure 3 shows the observer outputs. It can be seen
that apart from the first 2 time instants, observer outputs
1 and 2 are identical and thus selected by the major-
ity vote function for further processing. The inequality
for the first 2 time instants is caused by the latency
in the observers, more specifically the latency equals
maxj deg pj(ξ) = 2.
Fig. 3: Observer pj(ξ) outputs
Figure 4 shows the signals for yˆi − yi. It can be
seen that apart from the first 4 time instants, the dif-
ference between the corrected output signals and the
attack free system output is negligible, meaning that
Algorithm 2 indeed reconstructs the attacked 3rd output
signal correctly in accordance with Theorem VII.2. The
inequality at the first 4 time instants is caused by the
latency in observers pj(ξ)s and output regeneration shift
operators cj(ξ), more specifically the latency equals
maxi deg pi(ξ) + maxj deg cj(ξ) = 4.
Fig. 4: Comparison for different outputs
B. Example 2
Consider a 6-output stable voltage-source converter
[12] that is modelled as a discrete-time LTI system. After
discretization by means of the zero-order hold method
with sampling period Ts = 200µs, the resulting R(ξ)
matrix is given by
R(ξ) = ξI6 − exp(A˜Ts), (23)
where A˜ is given by
A˜ =

−R1L1 ω1 0 0 − 1L1 0
−ω1 −R1L1 0 0 0 − 1L1
0 0 −R2L2 ω1 1L2 0
0 0 −ω1 −R2L2 0 1L2
1
C0
0 − 1C0 0 0 ω1
0 1C0 0 − 1C0 −ω1 0

, (24)
with parameters shown in Table I.
TABLE I: System main parameters
L1 4.3mH R2 67.3mΩ
R1 83.1mΩ C0 18µF
L2 2.4mH ω1 100piRad/s
9The Kronecker-Hermite canonical form of R(ξ) can
be computed as follows, where we denote a × 10b as
aeb.
1 0 0 0 0
7.4e2ξ5 − 1.8e3ξ4 + 2.9e3ξ3
−2.9e3ξ2 + 1.8e3ξ − 7.3e2
0 1 0 0 0
94ξ5 − 2.7e2ξ4 + 4.3e2ξ3
−4.8e2ξ2 + 2.9e2ξ − 1.4e2
0 0 1 0 0
7.4e2ξ5 − 1.8e3ξ4 + 2.9e3ξ3
−2.9e3ξ2 + 1.8e3ξ − 7.3e2
0 0 0 1 0
94ξ5 − 2.7e2ξ4 + 4.3e2ξ3
−4.8e2ξ2 + 2.9e3ξ − 1.4e2
0 0 0 0 1
4.7ξ5 − 3.2ξ4 + 3.3ξ3
−2.4ξ2 + 1.2ξ − 3.3
0 0 0 0 0
3.6e4ξ6 − 1.3e5ξ5 + 2.3e5ξ4 − 2.9
e5ξ3 + 2.3e5ξ2 − 1.2e5ξ + 3.6e4

Using Corollary V.2, we find that the system is maxi-
mally secure, i.e., δ(Σ) = 6. Furthermore, we compute
the observers pj(ξ)s as
p1(ξ) = 1.3e2ξ
5 − 2.7e2ξ4 + 2.2e2ξ3 − 69ξ2 − 88ξ + 78
p2(ξ) = 4.1e− 2ξ5 − 19ξ4 + 44ξ3 − 65ξ2 + 75ξ − 35
p3(ξ) = −72ξ5 + 1.5e2ξ4 − 1.2e2ξ3 + 39ξ2 + 49ξ − 44
p4(ξ) = −2.3e−3ξ5 + 11ξ4 − 24ξ3 + 36ξ2 − 42ξ + 19
p5(ξ) = −4.7ξ5 + 3.2ξ4 − 3.3ξ3 + 2.4ξ2 − 1.2ξ + 3.3.
According to Theorems IV.1 and IV.2, any attacks on
maximally 5 of the outputs are guaranteed to be detected
and attacks on maximally 2 of its outputs are guaranteed
to be corrected. Note that for this example it is easy to
construct attack scenarios that attack 3 or 4 of the outputs
but can still be corrected by our method.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed attack detection and correc-
tion methods for zero-input discrete LTI systems in the
noise-free case. The purpose of this paper is to provide
a proof of concept around the application of ideas from
error control coding theory to handle attacks on LTI
systems. We have shown how the interaction between
the inner system dynamics and the sensor placements
determines the vulnerability of the system against sensor
attacks. We quantified this via the notion of a system
security index. We presented detection and correction
methods that exploit the known dynamics of the system.
In these methods the security index plays a prominent
role.
Future research directions are: build on the discussed
results to develop attack detection and correction meth-
ods for different system models such as systems with
disturbance and noise, multi-input multi-output systems,
nonlinear systems and systems over finite alphabets.
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